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ABSTRACT
This study considers the response of child labor supply and schooling attendance to anticipated
social pension income in South Africa. For black households in South Africa, the social pension is
large, highly anticipated, and shared across generations. Moreover, pension benefits are largely
determined by age in South Africa's extremely poor black population, and this study uses the age
discontinuity in the pension benefit formula for identification. The South African social pension thus
presents an unusually clean test of the applicability of the Life-Cycle/Permanent Income model to
child labor and schooling decisions in developing countries. In the present case, the data support the
theory that liquidity constraints contribute to high levels of child labor. When households become
eligible for the social pension in South Africa, the resulting increase in household non-labor income
is associated with a sizeable decline in child labor and increases in schooling. Changes in child labor
and schooling are largest among pensioners with little formal education. This finding suggests that









1.  Introduction 
Few issues in developing countries draw more public attention than child labor.  
Governments in both rich and poor nations battle child labor in the developing world largely 
with policies aimed at mitigating the demand for child labor.  This policy reflects the view that 
families choose to send their children to work, because the return to child labor is greater than 
that of the alternative activities of the child such as schooling as discussed in Shultz (1960).  If 
(as implied by Becker 1975 and made explicit in Baland and Robinson 2000) child labor is 
higher than families desire because of liquidity constraints, lowering the demand for child labor 
may only increase the need to send children to work and may be punitive against those in most 
need of assistance.
1  Moreover, increases in household income through economic growth and 
development can ameliorate child labor associated with liquidity constraints.  However, growth 
may raise the earnings opportunities open to children as well.  Thus understanding the role of 
liquidity constraints in child labor supply is critical to understanding how child labor will change 
with economic development.  This study examines the role liquidity constraints play in child 
labor supply and schooling decisions by examining how these decisions respond to receipt of 
large, anticipated increases in household income. 
Even for consumption smoothing, the evidence on the significance of liquidity constraints 
is decidedly mixed in both high and low income countries (Browning and Lusardi 1996).  Formal 
financial institutions are poorly developed in general in low-income countries (Townsend 1995), 
but despite this, poor agricultural households within low-income countries appear to be effective 
in smoothing their consumption over predictable, seasonal variation in agricultural incomes as if 
they faced perfect credit markets (e.g. Paxson 1993 and Jacoby and Skofias 1998).  The evidence 
from unanticipated changes in income is varied, but a number of studies find qualified support 
for the permanent income hypothesis by examining the household’s marginal propensity to 
consume from income shocks attributable to rainfall (e.g. Paxson 1992).  Morduch (1994, 1995, 
                                                 
1 The Basu and Van (1998) model is an extreme version of this model where there are no capital markets, and 
children work if and only if their income is required to meet basic subsistence needs.   2
1999) emphasizes that credit constrained household may turn to mechanisms other than 
borrowing to smooth consumption.  Possible mechanisms for consumption smoothing are 
variation in adult (Kochar 1999, Frankenberg, Smith, and Thomas 2003) or child labor (Jacoby 
and Skoufias 1997).  Indeed, three recent papers have found a strong relationship between 
unanticipated income shocks and child labor (Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti 2003, Guarcello, 
Mealli, and Rosati 2003, and Yang 2003). 
Household responses to unanticipated changes in income are of considerable interest in 
their own right, but four issues complicate using shocks to examine the role of liquidity 
constraints in child labor supply and schooling decisions.  First, economic shocks will be 
associated with changes in the relative return to child time in various activities.  For example, 
recovering from a flood may raise local wage rates as the community recovers; it may lower 
them as a consequence of a lost harvest; or it may cause the school to close.  Moreover, since 
most children work within their own homes, a within community association between child labor 
or schooling's response to the shock and household assets may reflect how assets and child time 
enter into the household's production function (as modeled formally in Jacoby's 1994 adaptation 
of the Ben-Porath 1967 model).  Second, unanticipated changes in household income can be 
insured against even in the presence of liquidity constraints.  Thus, studies of household 
responses to unanticipated changes in income confound failures in insurance mechanisms with 
liquidity constraints, and it seems difficult to separately identify each.  Third, the extent to which 
a change in family income is unexpected is difficult for the econometrician to identify.  A 
perennial question in studies of crop shocks for example is the extent to which the disaster is 
unanticipated.  Fourth, even if a researcher can separate the predictable and unpredictable parts 
of household income, it is never clear if this separation corresponds to what the family decision-
maker perceives.  For these latter two reasons, recent tests of the consumption smoothing life-
cycle/permanent income hypothesis models have tended to examine household responses to 
well-defined, anticipated income changes (e.g. Parker 1999, Souleles 1999 and 2002).   3
The anticipated income increase explored in this paper comes from a large social pension 
program in South Africa.  The black population of South Africa is substantially poorer than the 
white population.  Hence, when the relatively meager white Old Age Pension (OAP) program 
was extended to other South Africans at the end of apartheid, the social pension became a large 
cash transfer.  There is a means test in the OAP that binds for most white households but affects 
few black households (Case and Deaton 1998).  Thus, the primary determinant of the cash 
transfer is the age of the beneficiary, and there is little uncertainty about the benefit level 
(Alderman 1999).  Moreover, the South African social pensions are so large (for black 
households, the 1999 benefit of 520 Rand per month more than doubles black median per capita 
income) that they are well-known and highly anticipated by recipients (Lund 1993).  Further, 
black South African households are typically multi-generational, so there is ample scope for this 
pension income to be shared with children.  In fact, other studies of the OAP have documented 
sharing of the pension benefit with co-resident adults (Lund 1993, Bertrand, Mullainathan, and 
Miller 2003), across households (Jensen 2004), and with children (Duflo 2000 and 2003).  
Consequently, the South African social pension seems an unusually clear environment in which 
to consider the relationship between child labor, schooling, and liquidity constraints. 
  This study examines the response of child labor to the timing of income by comparing 
child labor supply and schooling in households that are eligible for the OAP to households that 
are not eligible.  The empirical work in this paper employs a regression discontinuity design to 
address the problem that households with elders eligible for the pension are older and may differ 
in systematic ways from households without eligible elders.  This paper finds large changes in 
child labor and schooling when anticipated income is received, a finding consistent with the 
presence of liquidity constraints.  Once households become age eligible for the pension income, 
child labor declines and schooling increases.  Declines in child labor are largest in market work 
such as work for wages, work on the family farm, or work in the household business.  School 
attendance increases with pension eligibility, and school attainment is increasing in the time that   4
the household has been eligible for the pension.  The effect of pension eligibility on child labor 
and schooling appears to vary with the gender of the elder.  In general, child labor decreases and 
schooling increases more when men reach eligibility than when women become pension eligible 
although the difference between men and women elders is not statistically significant in every 
specification.  Male pension eligibility is associated with an approximately 35 percent decline in 
hours worked per week and a rise in school attendance to almost 100 percent.  These findings 
imply that because of male pension eligibility 23,000 children are attending school who would 
otherwise not and over 180 million fewer hours were worked by children in a 1999. 
  This finding of liquidity constraints in the child labor decision supports the argument that 
the high levels of child labor in poor countries may reflect market imperfections associated with 
poverty rather than the families decision that the relative return to child labor is higher.  
Corroborating evidence for this study is available from Jacoby and Skofias (1997), Beegle, 
Dehejia, and Gatti (2003), Guarcello, Mealli, and Rosati (2003), and Yang (2003) who find that 
schooling and child labor supply appear to be important coping mechanisms in the household's 
response to unanticipated changes in income as well.  Existing child labor programs directed at 
curtailing labor demand may be misdirected, and punitive, income-reducing policies such as 
trade sanctions designed to punish counties with high levels of child labor have the potential to 
increase child labor.
2 
  The next section of the paper presents a model child labor where liquidity constraints 
induce higher levels of child labor than are optimal.  Section 3 describes the old age pension and 
the identification strategy.  Section 4 presents the results.  Section 5 discusses several factors that 
may influence the interpretation of the results in this study including measurement error in age, 
endogenous household composition, age-discontinuities at pension ages absent the pension 
                                                 
2 Basu and Van (1998) point out that if labor demand mechanisms were effective in eliminating child labor, there 
may be general equilibrium effects that raise adult wages enough to eliminate the household’s desire to send 
children to work.  Thus, the argument that attacking labor demand may only serve to increase child labor assumes 
that these labor demand oriented policies will not curtail child labor enough to induce these general equilibrium 
wage effects.  Ranjan (2001) is a more formal development of this argument in the context of liquidity constraints.   5
program such as might be caused by formal retirement or cohort-targeted child labor or 
schooling programs, and alternatives to liquidity constraints to explain timing of income effects 
on child labor and schooling.  Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Liquidity constraints and child labor - theory 
  The basic model of Baland and Robinson (2000) has a single household decision-maker 
(a parent) who makes child labor and schooling decisions after making other household income 
decisions.  The parent lives two periods.  In the first period, the parent chooses savings s and the 
fraction of child time spent working,  h.   1 m  is the household's income each period from sources 
other than child labor.  Wages from working are normalized to 1.  Thus, consumption in the first 
period is:  11 cmh s =+ − .  In the second period, in addition to the parent's income  2 m,   the parent 
receives the savings income and gives a bequest b to the child:  22 cms b = +−.
3  Parental utility 
depends on consumption in period 1 and 2 as well as the well being of the child: 
() () 12 ,, pc c Uc c Uw .  Child well-being depends on the return to the time spent not working, 
() 1 zh − , and income from bequests:  ( ) 1 c wz hb = −+ . 
  If savings and bequests are not zero, then household chooses child labor so that marginal 
cost in terms of foregone consumption today due to decreased child labor exactly equals the 
additional return to the child of foregoing child labor:  ( ) 11 zh ′ − = .  Thus, child labor is privately 
efficient in the Baland and Robinson framework.  If income is higher in the second period than in 
the first, child labor supply is unaffected.  The household merely adjust savings.  However, with 
liquidity constraints, the household cannot move resources between periods.
 4  Hence, child labor 
                                                 
3 Adding an interest rate, discount rate, and (later) altruism parameter to the model does not affect the basic intuition 
of the test in this paper.  Hence, they have been omitted from this presentation for simplicity. 
4 Either the presence of liquidity constraints or constraints on bequests can generate inefficiencies.  Without 
bequests, children cannot compensate parents for the foregone consumption that comes from decreasing child labor.  
Hence, a failure to observe child labor responses to the timing of income does not necessarily imply that child labor 
is privately efficient, because the timing of income should have no effect on bequests although permanent income 
obviously will.  Similarly, the observed levels of child labor after the relaxation of liquidity constraints are not 
necessarily privately efficient.   6
supply in period one depends on the household’s marginal utility of consumption in period one, 
and the resulting educational investments will be lower than in the equilibrium without liquidity 
constraints:  () 11 zh ′ −> .  Child labor is inefficiently high from the household’s perspective.
5 
  In Baland and Robinson’s model, identifying an income elasticity of child labor supply is 
indicative of a constraint on liquidity or bequests.  However, the fact that child labor is income 
elastic is not sufficient for testing the efficiency of child labor in a more general model of child 
labor as in Becker (1965) or Bommier and Dubois (2003).  First, leisure or education may be a 
normal good in parental preferences.  Higher income thereby may lead to increases in leisure and 
education.  Thus, to test for liquidity constraints in child labor, identification needs to be based 
on the timing of income.
6  Second, the source of variation in the timing of income must not arise 
from the same household decision-making process that determines child labor supply.  For 
example, Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) show that child labor supply and household income both 
vary with agricultural seasons.  This could generate misleading results in identifying liquidity 
constraints, because changes in the value of child time outside of schooling coincide with 
changes in income, independent of any effect of expected seasonal variation in income on child 
labor.  Third, the variation in the timing of income must be foreseeable to both the 
econometrician and the household.  For the test of liquidity constraints posited here, the variation 
in the timing of income must reflect the variation perceived by the household decision-maker.  A 
mismatch between the econometrician’s understanding of predictable variation in the timing of 
income and the household’s may yield false evidence of liquidity constraints if the income that 
appears anticipated to the econometrician is unanticipated by the household. 
  The timing of income influences child labor supply with liquidity constraints, because the 
household’s inability to move resource between periods causes time allocation decisions to 
                                                 
5 Baland and Robinson (2000) show that these results for savings and bequests also hold under reciprocal altruism 
when children value the well-being of their parents. 
6 There may still be a slight income effect associated with the timing of income because of the household’s present 
value calculation.  For example, if a million dollars today has a slightly higher present value than a million dollars 
tomorrow.  The assumption in this paper is that the magnitude of this income effect based on timing is small.   7
depend on the household’s marginal utility of consumption.  In a more general model, there are a 
number of other ways in which liquidity constraints may cause higher levels of child labor.  For 
example, households might under-invest in child nutrition because of liquidity constraints, 
lowering the child’s productivity in school.  Improved nutrition as a result of receipt of the cash 
transfer (e.g. Duflo 2003) may then increase the return to schooling and lower child labor.  
Alternatively, liquidity constraints could limit the (in or out) migration of household members.  
Changes in household structure as a result of the anticipated receipt of income (e.g. Edmonds, 
Mammen, and Miller 2003) may then lower the demand for child labor within the household.  
One can imagine several other mechanisms through which liquidity constraints affect child labor 
supply other than through the direct effect of income on child labor.  The possibility of these 
other mechanisms means that the results of this study cannot be interpreted as reflecting the 
direct effect of income itself.  Nevertheless, to the extent that liquidity constraints cause these 
other factors to respond to the timing of income, these other factors are merely the mechanisms 
through which liquidity constraints generate higher levels of child labor than would be implied 
by the relative return to child labor.  In this way, the model of Baland and Robinson and the 
results of the test in this paper can be interpreted as reduced form evidence of changes in child 
labor from relaxing liquidity constraints rather than as an identification of the mechanism 
through which liquidity constraints influence child labor supply. 
3.  Testing for liquidity constraints in child labor decisions – an application 
3.1 The Old Age Pension Program (OAP) 
The OAP in South Africa provides a good setting to explore whether the economic 
activities of children depend on the timing of increases in household income.  The collapse of the 
apartheid system in the early 1990’s brought (among other things) the extension of the white 
pension program to elderly blacks.  This caused a dramatic increase in the pension receipts of 
almost all elderly blacks.   Historically, blacks received only a fraction of the state pension that 
whites received, but by 1994 most blacks and whites eligible for the pension were receiving   8
comparable amounts.  The maximum benefit in 1999 was 520 Rand per month (about $3 a day), 
122 percent of the median per capita monthly household income of blacks in 1999. 
The OAP has four important attributes that make it useful for this study.  First, the 
pension does not depend on the activities of other household members.
7  Hence, the pension 
itself does not create any incentive to change household composition or alter the activities of 
household members in order to receive the pension.  Second, there is a means test in the pension 
formula that is important in the white population, but in practice its impact on benefit 
determination for black South Africans is minimal because of the relative depravation of the 
black population.
8  Third, absent the means test, the age of co-resident household members 
determines whether the household is eligible for the pension.  A woman is pension eligible if she 
is age 60 or older.  A man is pension eligible at age 65 or older.  Thereby, the timing of the 
income receipt and the magnitude of the cash transfer is easily identified for both the 
econometrician and the household.  Fourth, it is not unusual for a pension eligible grandparent to 
reside with a grandchild in black South African households.  Hence, there is ample scope for the 
sharing of pension income with co-resident children and their parents, and evidence of this 
sharing permeates the academic literature on the OAP (Lund 1993, Case and Deaton 1998, 
Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Miller 2003, Duflo 2003). 
                                                 
7 The pension benefit formula explicitly does not consider pension income paid to an elder's spouse as well. 
8 A number of authors have observed that the means-test does not bind for most black African households (Case and 
Deaton (1998), Alderman (1999), Case (2001), Jensen (2002), Duflo (2003), and Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Miller 
(2003)).  While these studies work with data from 1993, the means-test in the pension benefit formula has not 
changed substantively between 1993 and 1999, and the income at which the means-test begins has increased since 
1993.  The means-test is based on the personal wage income of the recipient, but most elder blacks do not pay 
income taxes and thereby have no incentive to declare income for the calculation of the means-test.  In the South 
African tax code, individuals age 65 and older do not pay income tax so long as their personal income is below R47, 
222 per year.  Less than 9 percent of the control group data in this study report total household income at or above 
R47, 222.  Even if reported, relatively few elder blacks report incomes near the pension age which are high enough 
to be affected by the means-test, and in the data used in this study all but 4 percent of pension recipients report total 
household income in a category at or above the maximum pension benefit of 520 Rand per month.  The means-test 
only begins when official incomes exceed 30 percent of the maximum grant.  It does not include the income of other 
household members other than the spouse, and it explicitly does not include spouse's pension income.  
Consequently, if the means test were implemented regardless of an individual's tax status, it would only affect 
pensioners with a formal sector income above 156 Rand per month.  When the dataset used in this study is restricted 
to households in the control group, only 42 percent of households have per capita incomes above 156 Rand per 
month when all sources of income are considered (most of which would not be reported to tax authorities).   9
3.2 Empirical methodology 
The response of child labor supply to the timing of income is tested by comparing the 
labor supply of children in households with a pensioner to children in households with an elder 
that is not yet pension eligible.  The influence of the gender of the pensioner on the link between 
the timing of pension income and child labor is also examined. 
Since pensioners are not randomly distributed among households, the comparison of 
child labor in households with pensioners to child labor in households where the elder is not yet 
pension eligible raises two concerns.  First, take-up of the pension may be an endogenous 
household decision.  For example, Case and Deaton (1998) find that households receiving the 
pension are poorer on average.  If children are more likely to work in poorer households, then 
child labor may be positively associated with pension take-up.  This endogenous pension take-up 
problem is addressed by focusing on pension eligibility rather than actual take-up.  For black 
households, pension eligibility depends on the pensioner’s age rather than any household 
decisions.  Women become eligible for the OAP at age 60.  Men become eligible at age 65.  
Hence, the test for liquidity constraints affecting child labor supply comes from comparing child 
labor supply in households with a man at or above age 65 or woman at or above 60 to child labor 
supply in households with a younger elder. 
  By focusing on eligibility rather than pension take-up, the results of this paper can be 
interpreted as reduced form regressions for a model where pension income is instrumented by 
eligibility.  The income data associated with the child labor data used in this study are poor; 
estimating the structural model is infeasible.
9  Moreover as discussed in section 2, there is no 
reason in examining liquidity constraints to restrict the timing of income to influence child labor 
through the direct effect of income on child labor alone.  Indirect effects can still identify 
liquidity constraints.  Nevertheless, there needs to be a link between pension eligibility and 
                                                 
9 The questionnaire collects income by asking for total household income in the last year.  Rather than recording an 
income amount, the survey asks the respondent to select one of several broad categories (60 percent of the 
population falls in one of the five categories), and 5 percent of the sample used in this study does not respond to the 
income question.   10
household income in order to interpret the results of this study in terms of liquidity constraints.  
Several studies using other datasets document a link between pension eligibility and household 
income in black South African households.
10  In the dataset used in this study, 80 percent of 
eligible households report take-up of the pension.  The link between household income and 
pension eligibility in the data used in this study is discussed in detail in Appendix 1.  The 
probability that the household reports receiving pension income increases by 600 percent with 
pension eligibility, and  the probability that a household reports an income at or above the 
pension amount of 520 Rands per month rises by 12 percentage points if at least one co-resident 
elder is pension eligible (t-statistic 8.167).  Henceforth, when considering the effect of pension 
eligibility on child labor, pension eligibility will be treated as reflecting additional household 
income. 
  The second main concern raised by the non-randomness of pension income is that 
households with pensioners may differ systematically from non-pension households.  In 
particular, households with pensioners are likely to be older on average than are households 
without a pensioner and are more apt to contain multiple generations.  Comparing children who 
co-reside with an elderly person to those who do not is problematic, because the presence of an 
elderly individual may influence the allocation of a child's time other than through income.  For 
example, an elder may need care, bringing additional household obligations to children.  
Alternatively, an older person may take over some of the duties performed by children.   
  These problems influence the empirical work in two ways.  First, the sample is limited to 
children that co-reside with an elder. In particular, the sample is restricted to children that co-
reside with a person between the ages of 50 and 75.  Restricting the sample in this manner means 
that the effect of a pensioner of a given gender is identified by comparing the effect of a person 
who is near but below pension age to a person who is of pension age (e.g. the effect of having a 
                                                 
10 See Edmonds and others (2003) for the 1996 South African census and Case and Deaton (1998) for evidence from 
a 1993 household survey.   11
64 year old man relative to a 66 year old man).   This type of identification is used in Bertrand 
and others (2003) and Case (2001).   
An obvious concern in this approach is that the pension indicator may capture age trends 
in addition to the effect of pension income on child labor.
11  Thus, this study allows for 
differences in child labor with the age of the elder by including a series expansion in the ages of 
the oldest male and female in the household in each regression.  The basic regression approach is 
thus: 
(1)  ( ) 01 2 3 *, ij i i i i i i ij H PEF PEM PEF PEM AOM AOF β ββ β π ε =+ + + + +  
where H is the labor supply of child j in household i, PEF indicates the presence in the 
household of a female who is at or above age 60 (and thus pension eligible), PEM indicates the 
presence in the household of a male who is age 65 or older (pension eligible), PEF*PEM allows 
for an interaction of these two, and  ( ) , ii AOM AOF π  is a third order polynomial expansion in the 
age of the oldest man and age of the oldest woman and all of their interactions.
12  With the series 
expansion to control for age trends, the coefficient on the indicator for pension eligibility can be 
interpreted as the change in child labor associated with changing a person of gender g from 
ineligible to pension eligible after controlling for the changes in child labor associated with the 
presence of generally older people. 
4. Results 
4.1 Child labor  
                                                 
11 Consider three examples.  First, pensioners are older than the aged who are not pension eligible.  Thus, the 
pension indicator may capture that older people will have older grandchildren and great-grandchildren who are more 
likely to work and not attend school.  Second, because the child and grandchildren of pensioners should be relatively 
older, there may be larger household sizes around pensioners.  There are a number of ways in which household size 
may increase or decrease child labor supply.  Third, surviving to pension age may indicate that elders (especially 
elder males) are in relatively rich households.  Wealthier households may be less likely to have children work or 
may have greater employment opportunities open to children. 
12 Every regression in this paper has been re-estimated allowing the effects of pension income to vary by child 
gender.  In every case, the data do not reject the hypothesis that the gender interactions are insignificant.  Thus, 
gender interactions are not included in estimating (1) in the reported results.   12
This study tests for liquidity constraints in child labor decisions by examining how child 
labor in black households in South Africa responds to the fully anticipated changes in non-labor 
income that comes from the OAP.  Without liquidity constraints, increases in income may 
change savings, but child labor is determined by setting the return to not working equal to the 
opportunity cost of not-working.  However, without savings, child labor supply in the first period 
depends on the household's marginal utility of consumption in the first period.  Thus, the timing 
of household income can affect the labor supply of children in addition to savings and bequests.  
The test of the role of liquidity constraints in child labor decisions in this paper is to examine 
whether child labor supply changes when households move from anticipating the OAP income to 
actually being eligible to receive the income. 
This study’s empirical analysis is based on the June 1999 Survey of the Activities of 
Youth in South Africa (SAYP) described in detail in Appendix 1.  The SAYP collects data on the 
activities of children over a 12-month reference period.  The activities of children are grouped 
into household and market economic activities. Household economic activities include 
housekeeping and caretaking activities within the child’s household or school.  Market activities 
include running any kind of business, big or small, for the child him/herself; working unpaid in a 
family business; working in farming activities on the family plot, food garden, cattle post or 
kraal; catching or gathering any fish, prawns, shellfish, wild animals or any other food, for sale 
or for family consumption; doing any work for a wage, salary or any payment in kind; collecting 
wood for fuel or water; and begging for money or food in public.  Total hours worked are the 
sum of hours in household and market economic activities.
13 
Table 1 contains the summary statistics for the children in black-headed households 
interviewed in phase 2 of the SAYP (see appendix 1).  This study focuses on the 2,752 children 
                                                 
13 Many studies of child labor ignore time in household work.  However, this can produce very misleading results.  
For example, consider a household where a mother moves away from home to locations that better reward her skills.  
Children, then, pick up the household duties performed by the mother and exit the types of market work that they 
performed when their mother was present.  This might look like a decline in child labor if household activities are 
ignored.  However, if the child moves from attending to school and working 2 hours a week helping out on the farm 
to no school and 40 hours a week filling in for a parent, it would not be correct to claim that the child works less.   13
ages 10-17 in columns 3 and 4 of table 1 that co-reside with a person between the ages of 50 and 
75.  Comparing children 10-17 that reside with an elder who is not pension eligible (column 3) to 
children that reside with a pension eligible person (column 4) suggests that pension eligibility is 
associated with a decline in total hours worked for children.  The decline is larger in market work 
than in household work.  Treating column 3 as the reference group, pension eligibility is 
associated with approximately a 10 percent decline in hours worked in market work. 
  Of course, this comparison in table 1 may confound age trends with the pension.  Hence, 
age patterns in child labor are controlled for with the framework of (1).  Table 2A begins by 
considering total hours worked in both market and household work.  In column 1, after 
controlling for differences associated with the age of the oldest household members, hours 
worked declines by 2 hours when a female becomes pension eligible if there is no eligible male 
in the household and by 6 hours when a male is pension eligible if there is no eligible female. 
The combined effect of having both a male and a female pension eligible in the households is 
less than the sum of each individual's effect.  Having both a co-resident male and female 
pensioner is associated with a decline in hours worked of approximately 5 hours.
14  
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14 Out of 2,752 children between ages of 10 and 17 that co-reside with a person age 50 or greater, only 172 report 0 
hours of work.  Hence, the left censoring of the hours worked distribution is not a substantive problem in table 3.  
However, column 6 contains Tobit results.  They match the corresponding OLS results closely.   14
  Figure 1 presents the raw data and the results from column 1 of table 2A.  The raw 
sample means illustrate the basic finding that child labor declines with pension eligibility.  In 
households where the oldest man ranges between 59 and 64, average hours worked for children 
vary between 13.4 and 20 hours.  However, between ages 66 and 71, average hours worked for 
children range between 7.5 and 13.7.
 15  The regression line in figure 1 is computed by 
calculating the mean for all of the regression variables conditional on the age of oldest man and 
plotting the regression line at each age of the oldest man with all of the corresponding means.
16  
The general age trend controlled for in (1) is evident in figure 1 as well.  Both before and after 
age 65, child labor is increasing slightly in the age of the oldest man.  The observed pension 
effect comes from the dramatic decrease in child labor that shifts the post 65 mean downward. 
An elasticity calculation helps in interpreting the result that hours worked declines by 6 
hours per week with male pension eligibility.  The mean hours worked for children that co-reside 
with an elder who is not pension eligible is 17 hours.  If this is treated as a baseline for children 
that reside with a pension eligible male, the 6 fewer hours worked by a child who lives with a 
pension eligible male implies a 35 percent reduction in child labor.  For a household with a 
pension eligible male receiving the pension, the benefit corresponds to a 122 percent increase in 
household income.
17  The 35 percent reduction in child labor then implies a timing of income 
elasticity of child labor supply of approximately 0.3. 
                                                 
15 An obvious question in figure 1 is why child labor does not decline until after age 65.  One possibility is that there 
is significant delay in when the pension goes into effect.  More likely, the picture reflects considerable measurement 
error in age.  For example, the survey estimates the number of men age 65 to be 35 percent greater than the number 
of men age 64.  Edmonds and others (2002) find even greater age-heaping in the South African census.  One 
solution to this problem is to re-estimate the regressions in this paper, dropping all men age 65.  Reproducing 
column 1 of table 2A for this nonrandom sub-sample suggests that male pension eligibility is associated with 6.5 
fewer hours worked (t-statistic=3.04). 
16 Upon observing a child co-resident with a male pensioner, the probability that the child also co-resides with a 
pension eligible female is .57.  Thus, the decline with pension eligibility evident in figure 1 corresponds to the 5 
hours decline that accounts for the fact that men cohabite with women who may be pension eligible.  If the sample is 
restricted to households where the only pension eligible individual is male, male pension eligibility is associated 
with 7.3 fewer hours worked per week (t-statistic=3.63). 
17 In order to predict income absent the pension for a household with a pension eligible man, the household’s income 
category is regressed against the age of oldest man and woman polynomial for households with elder males that are 
not pension eligible.  The results from this regression are used to predict household income (without the pension) for 
pension eligible males.  Annual household income for a household with a pension eligible male would be between   15
A way to interpret the magnitude of these findings is to estimate the total reduction in 
child labor affected amongst black South African households as a result of the eligibility of men 
for the social pension program.  The SAYP estimates that there are approximately 531,771 black, 
pension eligible men in South Africa in 1999.  On average, these men live with 1.1 children 
between the ages of 10 and 17.  If the average reduction associated with the pension eligibility of 
men is 6 hours per week, then over 180 million fewer hours were worked in 1999 as a result of 
the pension eligibility of men. 
4.2 Robustness 
The main identifying assumption in this approach is that the series expansion in elder 
ages controls for differences between households that vary in whether their elders are pensioners.  
That is, if a child in a pension eligible house is switched to an ineligible house, the labor supply 
for that pension eligible household child now in the pension ineligible house will be the same as 
a child living in a pension ineligible house.  Specifically, for identifying the effect of male 
pension eligibility, the assumption is: 
(2)  () ( ) 10 ,, , 0 ,, , 0 PEM PEM E H AOF AOM PEF PEM E H AOF AOM PEF PEM == = == . 
The subscript on the expectations operator indicates whether the child is observed in a pension 
eligible house or not.  The other conditioning variables then define the child labor supply that a 
child would experience absent the pension eligible male.  The remainder of table 2A and table 
2B examine the SAYP data for evidence against this identification assumption. 
  There are two testable implications of (2).  First, (2) implies that the inclusion of other 
regression controls should not substantively alter estimates of the effect of pension eligibility on 
child labor.  To explore this, columns 2 – 5 of table 2A include various other controls in the basic 
regression (1).  Column 2 of table 2A includes controls for each child's age.  Column 3 adds 
province and urban fixed effects.  Column 4 contains child age controls, province and urban 
                                                                                                                                                             
4201 and 6000 Rand per year without the pension.  Treating the midpoint of this range as the average household 
income for a household with a male pensioner implies that average income for this group is 425 Rand per month.  
Thus, the pension of 520 Rand per month corresponds to a 122 percent increase in household income.   16
fixed effects, and housing controls.
18  Column 5 adds household composition controls to the 
covariates in column 4.
19  All four control strategies lead to estimates of pension effects that 
cannot be distinguished statistically from the results in column 1 that just condition on the 
expansion in age of oldest man and woman.
20  Thus, the data does not present evidence to reject 
the identification assumption in (2). 
  A second implication of (2) is that if artificial pension variables (e.g. assign pension 
eligibility to different ages) are created, there should not be any observed treatment effect.  Table 
2B contains these results.  Column 1 pretends that pension eligibility occurs at age 55 for women 
and 60 for men.  Column 2 pretends that pension eligibility occurs at age 65 for women, and 70 
for men.  Column 3 pretends that pension eligibility is at age 65 for women and 60 for men.  In 
every case, there is no evidence of the large changes in child labor observed with the actual 
pension ages.  Thus, the data do not reveal any evidence to suggest that the empirical method is 
providing false rejections of the hypothesis that child labor supply should not depend on the 
timing of income. 
  Throughout this study, the sample is restricted to households with persons age 50 to 75.  
The purpose of this restriction is to make the households with and without pensioners relatively 
comparable so that the variation for which the age of oldest man / woman polynomial controls 
for minor.  As a third robustness check, columns 4 and 5 of table 2B limit the source of variation 
used to identify the mean differences in child labor associated with pension eligibility.  Column 4 
includes dummy variables for the presence of a woman age 55 and man age 60.  Hence the 
                                                 
18 The survey collects detailed data on house characteristics, but little other household asset information.  Hence, 
housing characteristics are the best available way to control for differences in household wealth, although they may 
also depend on pension income (and could also depend on available child labor).  Ex ante, one would expect 
conditioning on house characteristics to attenuate the observed pension effects, because pension income may lead to 
improvements in household characteristics.  This may lead to less work for children. 
19 Household composition controls are a vector of dummies for the presence of a mother, a father, a grandparent, 
grandparents and parents, the number of household members 0-5, 6-9, 10-13, 14-17, 18-22, 22-49, 50-75, and 76 
plus. 
20 The remainder of this paper conditions on child age, gender, and province and urban fixed effects in addition to 
the polynomial in age of oldest man and age of oldest woman.  Housing characteristics and household composition 
controls are not included because of concerns that they are jointly determined with child labor.     17
interpretation of each of the pension indicators is the effect of having a pension eligible person 
relative to having a person of the same sex who is just below pension age.  For this narrowed 
group, the data continue to suggest the table 2A results: 6 fewer hours of work associated with 
male eligibility and 2 fewer hours of work associated with female eligibility.  Column 5 adds 
indicators for the presence of women above 65 and men above 70.  Thus, the pension indicators 
compare households where elders are within 5 years below pension eligibility to within 5 years 
above pension eligibility after controlling for age patterns.  With this narrower source of 
variation, the magnitudes of pension effects change from table 2A, albeit not in a statistically 
significant way.  Male pension eligibility is associated with 7 fewer hours of work and female 
pension eligibility is associated with 1 hour less of work. 
  In sum, all of the findings suggest that there are relatively large changes in the time a 
child spends working associated with the timing of pension income.  The effects of pension 
income are largest when the pension recipient is a male.  If the child labor supply decision is 
efficient in the Baland and Robinson (2000) sense that child labor supply reflects the balancing 
of returns to work against returns to school, whether or not the family has yet to receive the 
anticipated pension income should not affect the allocation of child time.  Thus, the child labor 
results in this section are consistent with liquidity constraints leading to higher levels of child 
labor than market prices would affect. 
4.3 Schooling 
  The test for liquidity constraints implies that anticipated income should not affect child 
labor nor should it affect schooling.  Most studies of the link between schooling and child labor 
find a negative correlation between the two but are careful to point out that some levels and types 
of work are compatible with schooling.  Thus, the observation in the previous section that 
pension eligibility (especially for males) is associated with declines in child labor does not 
necessarily imply that the data should reveal increases in schooling with pension eligibility.  As a   18
result, it is informative to examine the effect of pension income on schooling directly in a 
regression framework similar to (1). 
  There literature on liquidity constraints and schooling is a more developed on child labor 
supply.  In the U.S. context, Card (2001) has argued that the general finding that estimates of the 
returns to schooling increase in an instrumental variable setting is consistent with liquidity 
constraints influencing college matriculation decisions although Carneiro and Heckman (2002) 
are skeptical of this interpretation.  Kane (1994) and Ellwood and Kane (2000) find more direct 
empirical evidence of credit constraints in higher education decisions in the U.S., but Cameron 
and Heckman (1998, 2001) argue that their findings are more indicative of the effects of long-
term family background factors.  This argument may be relevant as well in the developing 
country evidence in Jacoby (1994) who examines liquidity constraints by comparing progress 
through schooling across households that differ in their asset holdings.  A focus on household 
responses to pension eligibility avoids this difficulty, because the source of identifying variation 
does not depend on family background attributes or unobserved household characteristics. 
  These schooling results are in table 3.  In column 1, the dependent variable is an indicator 
for whether a child currently attends school.  Male pension eligibility is associated with increases 
in the probability that a child attends school.  Curiously, declines in school attendance are 
observed when both male and female pensioners are present, but when all of the partials are 
added together in column 1, the data cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no effect of 
pension eligibility on schooling when both men and women are present.  Nevertheless, school 
attendance increases when men become pension eligible.  Figure 2 mimics the format of figure 1, 
presenting the raw sample means (circles) and the regression results from table 3.  Prior to 
pension ages, school attendance rates are below 91 percent.  With male pension eligibility, 
attendance rates stay above 96 percent.  Thus, the data suggest an effect of pension eligibility on 
schooling as would result if households are unable to incorporate anticipated income into 
decisions.     19
Figure 2: School Attendance and Pension Eligibility 
 
  Attendance is a crude measure of schooling, because it does not capture time spent in 
schooling nor does it capture time spent learning school work.  Both of these factors may be the 
more important mechanism through which child labor potentially trades off with schooling.  
While the dataset does not collect any information on time spent in school or on schoolwork, the 
questionnaire asks children that attend school if they have experienced financial problems with 
school in the last year and if work has forced them to miss school.  Thus, columns 2 and 3 of 
table 3 are limited the sample that attends school.  In column 2, the dependent variable indicates, 
conditional on currently attending school, whether a student is having problems with the cost of 
school.  The incidence of schooling cost problems declines with both male and female pension 
eligibility, although the magnitude of the effect of male pension eligibility is almost three times 
that of female pension eligibility.  Column 3 considers whether children that have missed school 
in the last 12 months have missed school for work.  The probability that a child misses school for 
work declines with male pension eligibility. 
  Thus, the schooling and child labor data provide a consistent story.  Receipt of 
anticipated large cash transfers is associated with increases in school attendance as well as 
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associated with over 180 million fewer hours worked by children in South Africa in 1999.  The 
educational results are similarly significant.  Male pension eligibility is associated with more 
than 23,000 children ages 10-17 attending school who otherwise would not (column 1 of table 
3).  If the decision to send a child to work reflects the relative return to child labor, then 
receiving additional cash income now (as opposed to receiving it in the near future) may affect 
savings decisions, but it should not affect schooling and the labor supply of children.  Thus, these 
findings are consistent with substantive liquidity constraints. 
5.  Identification and Interpretation 
5.1 Differences associated with the gender of the pensioner 
  The finding that pension income to a male is associated with greater reductions in child 
labor and increases in school attendance than is pension income to a female is surprising in the 
context of the existing literature on intrahousehold allocation with the Old Age Pension in South 
Africa.  Duflo (2003) finds pension effects on child anthropometrics only when women receive 
pensions.  Bertrand and others (2003) find greater adult labor supply effects when women 
receive pensions as well.  These studies consider income effects and not liquidity constraints.  If 
older women have longer life expectancies, the present value of the social pension is larger for 
women than for men, and therefore there should be larger income effects when women become 
eligible for the social pension.  With regards to liquidity constraints, if both men and women face 
liquidity constraints, the magnitude of the importance to the household of actually receiving the 
pension may dwarf the differences in present value of the male and female pensions.  This 
argument suggests that male and female pension eligibility should be associated with similar 
effects on child labor.  In many specifications, the data do not reject the hypothesis that male and 
female pension eligibility affects the same reduction in child labor even though the magnitude of 
the male coefficients is larger and statistically different from zero.  However, it is worth 
considering why the data might suggest large effects for male pension eligibility so uniformly.   21
  One possible explanation that is not correct is that male pension eligibility captures non-
linearity in income.  Roughly half of all pension eligible men also live with a pension eligible 
female, but the effect of adding a pension eligible male to a household with a pension eligible 
female is the coefficient on male pension eligibility plus the interaction term which generally 
attenuates the effect of male pension eligibility to be of the same magnitude as female eligibility 
(in table 2A for example).  Thus, when men and women co-reside, the timing effects for men and 
women are similar.  The large changes in child labor and schooling are observed when men do 
not co-reside with pension eligible women. 
  One possible explanation for this is that men are more liquidity constrained than are 
women and that the presence of a female pensioner relaxes the liquidity constraint for men.  Men 
might be more liquidity constrained for several reasons.  First, it is possible that because women 
have a higher life expectancy, they face a weaker liquidity constraint than men.  Higher mortality 
risk makes future income more uncertain for men.  Second, if women have greater savings rates 
then men, then men are more apt to be liquidity constrained.  There might be gender differences 
in savings or access to formal credit, because of some aspect of the male personality or because 
women are more active in formal and informal lending groups in South Africa.  For example, 
informal savings groups called "Stockvels" are ubiquitous in South Africa, and they are typically 
all female.   
  Another possibility is that the difference between men and women may reflect some type 
of selection process for men working either through living arrangements or mortality.  For 
example, assume the distributions of tastes for education (or distaste for child labor) in the male 
and female populations of South Africa are identical and that the distribution of liquidity 
constraints in male and female populations are identical.  Further, suppose that surviving elderly 
women typically cohabitate with their extended family but that men do not, and that the men that 
cohabitate with extended family are those with strong tastes for schooling or those that are 
particularly liquidity constrained.  Then, the pension eligibility of men will be associated with   22
larger changes in child labor and schooling than that of women, because of this selection into 
what men live with children.  More generally, men and women can be equally liquidity 
constrained, but any self-selection mechanisms that leads the sample of cohabitant men to be 
either more altruistic or more liquidity constrained could cause changes in child labor and 
schooling to be larger for men. 
  In addition, it is not difficult to reconcile the finding of larger reductions in child labor 
with male pension eligibility with other studies of the OAP in a very simple model of intra-
household allocation where men and women have different spheres of control.  Becker (1973) 
and Lundberg and Pollak (1993) develop models of the household where men and women 
specialize into separate spheres of control within the household.  While a person's sphere of 
influence in the household may depend in part on the resources at that person's command (e.g. 
Lundberg and others 1997; Thomas and others 1999), it is conceivable that the effect of cash 
transfers on the person's spheres of influence may be of second order relative to the ability of a 
person to affect behavior within their existing sphere.  In Becker's model, women specialize 
within the household and men outside of the household.  In this world, then, cash transfers to 
women might have greater effects on within household decisions about children and cash 
transfers to men might have larger effects on how children interact with the outside world and in 
traditionally male dominated spheres.  Moreover, if household production activities (which may 
fall in female spheres of influence) are less income elastic, then the data should reveal larger 
declines in child labor with male pension eligibility.  This can be examined by looking at child 
labor supply in different types of work. 
  In fact, the data suggests the largest reductions in child labor are in market work (work 
for wages, work for a household business, work on a farm).  Table 4 breaks hours worked into 
hours in household activities and hours in market work.  Girls work more in the household and 
less in market work, although the difference in market work hours is not statistically significant.  
In columns 1 and 2 (column 2 contains Tobit results), the data do not reject the hypothesis that   23
neither the pension eligibility of men or women has any effect on child labor supply to household 
activities.  Most of the reduction in hours worked with pension eligibility appears in market work 
(columns 3 and 4).  In fact, out of the 6 hours less work per week experienced by children living 
with a pension eligible male, 5 of those hours appear to be in market work.  Thus, the fact that 
the statistically significant results in the data reject the model without liquidity constraints when 
men receive pension income appears easily reconcilable with an extension of the basic model of 
intrahousehold decision-making. 
5.2 Alternatives to the liquidity constraint interpretation 
  This study has interpreted the finding that child labor supply and schooling are 
responsive to the timing of income as evidence of liquidity constraints affecting these time 
allocation decisions.  There are, however, alternative explanations for why the timing of income 
affects child labor supply and schooling.  First, as noted by Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti (2003) in 
their discussion of an early draft of the present study, households may be myopic and not 
anticipate future income.  If this were true, then the results of this study would reveal an income 
effect, not a liquidity constraint.  Given the strong evidence that households in developing 
countries can smooth consumption over predictable seasonal variation in income in Paxson 
(1993) and Jacoby and Skofias (1998), it seems reasonable to assume that households are not 
myopic in their decisions with respect to a doubling of income like the Old Age Pension.  
Moreover, if households were myopic, it becomes difficult to understand the evidence that 
suggests schooling decisions are sensitive to anticipated returns to education such as Foster and 
Rosenzweig (1996). 
  Second, peer pressure to share income among family members may increase when 
pension cash is on-hand.  In the absence of liquidity constraints, actual pension receipt should 
have little impact on the well-being of the elderly.  It seems plausible to assume that peer 
pressure to share income and wealth is driven by an individual's relative living standards rather   24
than her cash on hand.  Under this assumption, then, the pressure to share income does not 
depend on the timing of income except under liquidity constraints. 
  Third, in the context of consumption responses to anticipatable social security tax 
changes in the U.S., Parker (1999) argues that a boundedly rational household may allow 
spending decisions to track income provided that this strategy does not make the household too 
much worse off than the fully rational strategy.  This behavior occurs, because it is costly for the 
individual to re-optimize her consumption plan with each change in income.  Given the 
magnitude of the cash transfer stemming from the old-age pension, it is hard to imagine that this 
nearly rational rule of tracking child labor and schooling to income would not make the 
household much worse off.   
  Two pieces of evidence suggest a scope for liquidity constraints to be the correct 
interpretation of the findings in this study.  First, men who co-reside with pension eligible 
women are less likely to be liquidity constrained because of the income brought in by the 
woman' pension.  In fact, when a man co-resides with a pension eligible woman, his pension 
eligibility yields about the same changes in child labor supply and schooling that does female 
eligibility (relatively small in magnitude and statistically insignificant, see table 2A).  Thus, the 
observed pension effects occur when only the female pensioner's income is not present.  Second, 
less educated elders may be more likely to be liquidity constrained.  If liquidity constraints are in 
play, the data should suggest larger pension effects on child labor supply and schooling in 
households where the elders are relatively less educated (assuming that myopia, peer influence, 
and the propensity to exhibit boundedly rational behaviors do not vary with education).  In the 
context of black South Africa, even the wealthiest 10 percent of the population are still very poor 
and maybe liquidity constrained.  Thus, a failure to find variation with elder education does not 
necessarily reject liquidity constraints as an explanation. 
To explore this, the specification of equation (1) is modified to include interactions with 
the elder's education, EOM and EOF for eldest male and female respectively:   25
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Thus, the interpretation of  2 β is now the change in hours worked associated with the pension 
eligibility of a male with no education in a household without a pension eligible female.   5 β  is 
the incremental change in hours worked associated with the pension eligibility of a male for each 
additional year of education of that male in a household without a pension eligible female.  The 
results from this specification are in Table 5. 
Each column in Table 5 includes a different dependent variable.  In column 1, the 
dependent variable is total hours worked in the last week.  Column 2 considers results for hours 
in household work, column 3 refers to hours in market work, and column 4 contains marginal 
effects for the probit regression where the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the 
child reports attending school.  Each regression mimics the specification of column 3 in Table 
2A.
21   
Child labor declines are decreasing in the education of male pensioners.  Consider the 
case of a male elder who becomes pension eligible and does not reside with an eligible female.  
The estimated decline in hours worked associated with pension eligibility is 40 percent higher 
when the elder male has no education (compare Column 1 of Table 5 to Column 3 of Table 2A).  
Each additional year of education reduces the estimated decline in hours work with the pension 
eligibility of males by 8 percent so that the estimated decline in total hours worked associated 
with the pension eligibility of males is zero for pensioners who have completed high school.  The 
data do not suggest a link between the education of elders and the association between pension 
eligibility and school attendance, but this may just be because the only households in which there 
was any margin to move school attendance substantially were households with low education.   
An alternative specification would bifurcate the sample based on the education of the elders.  If 
                                                 
21 The dataset is missing education of elders for 146 children, and they are omitted from the analysis.   26
the sample is restricted to pensioners without completed primary school, the results correspond 
to what would be expected from Table 5:  less educated elders experience larger declines in child 
labor with pension eligibility.   Thus, the declines in child labor are largest in households that are 
most apt to be liquidity constrained. 
5.3 Additional Identification Issues 
The above results are based on comparing households that currently receive the pension 
to households that will receive the pension in the near future after controlling for general patterns 
in child labor and schooling associated with the age of the oldest man and woman in the 
household.  This section highlights issues of lead and lags in program response, measurement 
error in age, endogenous household composition, retirement absent the pension, price effects of 
the means-test, and cohort effects that should be discussed in the context of this study. 
First, households may respond to the pension either before or after actual eligibility even 
in the presence of liquidity constraints.  For example, a household may keep children in school in 
anticipation of the pension income.  This is particularly likely to be a problem if there are large 
“diploma” effects in the rewards to education.  Consider a household with a seven year old girl.  
She can go to school now or she can work.  If a parent knows that in two years time, the girl will 
be needed to work and hence she will not complete primary school, a parent may choose to keep 
the child at home now (if the large payoff to schooling is past the point of the girls expected 
termination of schooling).  However, if the household anticipates receipt of the pension income 
in two years, then it knows that the girl can continue schooling in two years.  Hence, the 
household continues schooling today. With the approach of comparing households with a 
pensioner to households without a pensioner but near to a pensioner, this “lag or lead” problem 
will attenuate any observed effects of the timing of income. 
  Second, measurement error in age in the survey maybe a problem, because black South 
Africans have only recently begun to systematically register births.  This has created an 
administrative problem in implementing the South African OAP, because elder blacks without an   27
official documentation of their births have incentives to try and persuade government officials 
that they are of pension eligible age.  It is conceivable that survey respondents may believe that 
inflating ages in completing the data used below may help them receive pension income.  
Moreover, there may be targeting errors in the pension program such that some persons receive 
the pension other than at ages of eligibility.  Hence, there are likely to be several households 
defined as pension eligible that are not eligible and some households classified as ineligible that 
receive the pension.  This would attenuate the observed study's findings.  One option would be to 
omit pensioners at the ages of pension eligibility from the analysis.  As evident in Figure 1 and 
discussed in footnote 15, estimates of the effects of male pension eligibility on child labor supply 
increase if the pension age is omitted from the analysis. 
Third, some households respond to the pension by re-arranging (Edmonds and others 
2003).  Thus, the observed effects of the pension on child labor may actually just reflect changes 
in household composition rather than a change in child labor supply.  In Edmonds and others 
(2003) male pension eligibility is associated with a 7 percent increase in children in the age 
group studied here.  Under the hypothesis that children do not change their labor supply with the 
pension but rather that children who do not work move in, the 7 percent increase in these non-
working children implies that male pension eligibility would be associated with 1.2 fewer hours 
of child labor.  Hence, the results of this study are too large to be explained purely by children 
who do not work moving in.  In fact, there would need to be a 33 percent increase in children 
(none of whom work) to generate the observed reductions in child labor with the pension.  
Moreover, Column 5 of table 2A includes controls for both the presence of family (mother, 
father, grandparents) and the number of household members in various demographic groups.  
Estimates of the observed effects on child labor of male pension eligibility are even larger with 
these household composition controls.  This issue is discussed in greater detail in Appendix 2. 
  Fourth, retirement, absent the pension program, may complicate the interpretation of this 
study's findings.  If women stop working at 60 and men at 65 without the pension program, the   28
effect of retirement is intertwined with my estimates of the effect of the pension program.  Note: 
the problem is not that the pension may induce individuals to retire and thereby influence child 
labor and schooling.  If liquidity constraints prevent individuals from retiring and this thereby 
influences child labor supply, the results of this paper capture an indirect effect of the timing of 
income on child labor.  Rather, a problem arises if retirement absent the pension occurs at ages 
60 for women and 65 for men.   
  This is impossible to test in the data, but there are several reasons why this problem may 
not substantively alter the discussion.  First, most black South Africans are not engaged in formal 
employment that would have a fixed retirement age (Edmonds, Mammen, and Miller 2003).  
Second, most black South Africans are sufficiently poor that they do not have the luxury of 
terminating employment at a specified age (in the absence of the pension).  Typically, poor 
health and other problems associated with aging force the elderly out of employment.  Third, in a 
more general model of child labor than in section 2 where the value of child time inside the 
household is affected by the activities of other members, retirement could affect child labor 
supply within the household even when child labor decisions are efficient.  However, the largest 
effects observed above are in market work where the value of child time is more plausibly 
exogenous.  Hence, retirement is unlikely to be an important omitted variable in the results 
above. 
  Fifth, the means-test in the pension benefit formula could create incentives to retire at age 
60 for women and age 65 for men.  If implemented in practice, the means-test could create a 
price effect that would induce retirement.  Child labor could then be affected by this price 
induced retirement as with retirement absent the pension.  As discussed in section 3.1, the data 
do not suggest much scope for the means-test to be applied to black South Africans (9 percent of 
control households report household incomes at the level where individual incomes could be 
taxed), nor is there any evidence that the means test binds (96 percent of pension recipients 
reports incomes at or above the maximum benefit).  Moreover, the discussion in section 5.2   29
suggests that the pension eligibility effects are largest amongst the least educated households 
who are least apt to be affected by the means-test.  Thus, the data do not suggest that means-test 
induced retirement is likely to be a significant source of bias. 
  Sixth, age targeted government programs or interventions towards could be associated 
with pension eligibility, because older children are more apt to have an older grandparent who is 
thereby more apt to be pension eligible.  This sort of cohort effect is unlikely to be a problem in 
estimation for several reasons.  First, child age and elder age are not perfectly correlated.  The 
data contain both 12 year olds that live with pensioners and 12 year olds that do not.  Thus, the 
inclusion of the polynomial in child age should control for age-specific factors.  When table 2A 
controls for differences in child age (column 2), estimates of the effects of pension eligibility do 
not vary outside of the hundredths position from the estimates without age controls (column 1).   
Second, gross primary and secondary school enrollment rates have been increasing in South 
Africa throughout the 1990s (World Bank 2001).  If older children are more likely to be in 
pension households and less likely to have attended schooling, the bias from these omitted 
education trends would be away from finding an effect of pension income on schooling.  Third, 
omitted anti-child labor policies are unlikely to be behind this paper's findings.  International 
legislation is unlikely to differentially effect the 10-17 year olds considered in this paper in ways 
that the pension indicators will capture.  South Africa has been a signatory on the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the child since 1989 and just signed the UN Convention on the 
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor in 1999.  Domestic legislation has been minimal 
and likely to be more strongly associated with younger children.  The Basic Conditions 
Employment Act of 1997 prohibits the employment of children younger than 15 and regulates 
the employment of children over 15.  Thus, if this legislation has any effect, it would be to 
decrease the activities of younger children (thus biasing away from finding pension effects).
22  
                                                 
22 If the Act has been effective, there should be discontinuous changes in child labor supply or in the probability that 
a child works for pay at age 15.  However the SAYP does not reject the hypothesis that the labor supply of 15 year 
olds is the same as that of 14 and 16 year olds.   30
The 1996 constitution assigns every child a right to "be protected from exploitative labor 
practices . . .", but there do appear to be any concrete policies that have followed from this other 
than the Basic Conditions Employment Act. 
6.  Conclusion 
  This study finds that anticipated large cash transfer to the elderly in South Africa appear 
to be associated with increases in schooling and large declines in child labor.  The average South 
African child living with an elder that is not yet pension eligible spends 17 hours a week 
working.  In the data, pension income to an elder male is associated with 6 hours less work.  
Most of this decline in child labor is in market work which includes work in agriculture, work for 
pay, or work in a household business.  Schooling attendance in South Africa is relatively high, so 
the effects of pension income on schooling are necessarily much smaller.  96 percent of children 
that co-reside with an elder who is not pension eligible attend school.  The data suggest that 
pension income paid to an elder male is associated with school attendance rates that are close to 
100 percent.  These findings are robust to several specification checks, and they imply a large 
overall effect of the pension program.  For example, the results for male pension eligibility imply 
that 23,000 children are attending school who would otherwise not and a total of over 180 
million fewer hours were worked in a 1999. 
  The main focus of this study has been to test whether child labor supply is influenced by 
liquidity constraints.  Baland and Robinson (2000) show that if a family faces liquidity 
constraints, then child labor is inefficiently high (from the family's perspective), because child 
labor supply is determined by the marginal utility of consumption rather than the return to 
educational investments.  This study tests the efficiency of child labor decisions by examining 
how black households in South Africa respond to the fully anticipated, permanent changes in 
non-labor income that comes from the OAP.  If households are saving, the increased income may 
affect savings, but child labor decisions should be unaffected if they are already at an efficient 
level (where the private return to education equals its private opportunity cost).   However, the   31
findings of this paper suggest that some households with working children would rather their 
children not work, but because of some sort of market imperfection that creates liquidity 
constraints, households are forced to send their children to work.  The results of this paper are 
consistent with a story where an inability to borrow against a child's future return to education 
forces households to under-invest in education.  Receiving large cash transfers weaken this cash 
constraint, and hence children work less and attend school more. 
  As with much of the literature on the South African pension program, the child labor data 
reveal different effects when men receive pensions than when women receive pensions.  In 
particular, the effects of income on child labor and schooling are larger and have greater 
statistical significance when men receive the pension than when women receive the pension.  It 
might be possible to interpret this as a rejection of the unitary household model, but the puzzle is 
why pension effects appear larger for men.  Most of the intrahousehold literature finds larger 
benefits to children when women receive pension income.  Men and women may differ in the 
extent to which they are liquidity constrained, or they may have different spheres of control 
within the household.  Thus, income to women affects food and nutrition decisions whereas 
income to men affects the labor supply of children.  Of course, although the magnitudes and 
statistical significance of the effects of income to men are larger, the data do not reject in every 
specification the hypothesis that income to men and women have equal effects on child labor and 
in schooling.  Thus, the data do not support a strong intra-household interpretation of these 
results. 
  The policy implications of the finding that child labor is affected by the timing of income 
are substantial.  A great deal of the literature on the determinants of child labor, going back as far 
as Marx, argues that parents send their children to work, because the return to working is greater 
than the return to not-working.  This view then suggests that, if ending child labor is a policy 
priority, countries should focus on interventions directly related to child labor.  For example, 
countries should use coercion to forcibly lower the return to child labor or increase returns to   32
schooling.  However, the results of this study suggest that, for some households, child labor 
stems more from market imperfections than from high returns to child labor or low returns to 
education.  Hence, in these households liquidity constraints are affecting higher child labor 
supply, attacking child labor may best be accomplished by attacking poverty, developing 
markets, and building financial intermediaries.  With substantive liquidity constraints, actions 
design to prohibit child labor directly (such as trade sanctions) may impose costs on the poorest 
parents rather than the most callous and could, in the end, serve to worsen child labor (Ranjan 
2001).     33
Appendix 1: The Survey of the Activities of Young People, 1999 
The 1999 Survey of the Activities of Young People or SAYP (conducted by Statistics 
South Africa with the help of the International Labor Organization) is the first nationally 
representative survey in South Africa to collect detailed data about the allocation of child time.  
The survey also collects basic information about all of the members of a child's household 
including age eligibility and participation in the OAP.   
The SAYP was conducted in two phases (Statistics South Africa 2000).  The first phase 
employed a brief questionnaire designed to identify whether or not a household had children and, 
if so, if any children participated in any economic activities.  In the SAYP, a household consists 
of a single person or a group of people who live together for at least four nights a week, who eat 
together, and who share resources. A household may occupy more than one structure. People that 
occupy the same dwelling unit but do not share food or other essentials are regarded as separate 
households. A domestic worker living in separate domestic workers quarters or who is paid a 
cash wage by the main household (even if she or he has most of her or his meals with the 
household) is regarded as a separate household.  In this way, this study misses domestic workers 
that live within their employer's household in separate quarters. 
Of the 10,480 sampled black households with children in phase 1, 74 percent had at least 
one child participating in an economic activity.  In phase 2, a sample was drawn out of the sub-
population with any working children.  The definition of working for this re-sampling was broad: 
it included both household duties as well as work outside of the household.  In this second phase, 
detailed questions about the allocation of child time were administered.  Both phase 1 and phase 
2 are studied in the empirical work in the text, but the detailed schooling and child labor data 
come from the phase 2 sample.  Hence, these results are only representative to the population of 
households where at least one child works an hour or more in household or market production. 
The aim of this paper to use the data on child labor in households without pensioners but 
with someone over 50 to learn about what the labor supply of children that co-reside with 
pensioners would be absent the pension, after controlling for general age trends.  If the effect of 
the pension income is to move households from having children working to no children working, 
then the group in the data that are both pension eligible and qualify for the second round of the 
SAYP might be special and incomparable to the group of households without a pensioner but 
with a child labor.  To evaluate this problem, an indicator for whether a household is selected 
into phase 2 is regressed on pension eligibility.  Having a co-resident female pensioner decreases 
the probability of being selected by 1.5 percentage points and having a co-resident male 
pensioner increases the probability of being selected by less than a tenth of a percent (for a 
baseline, 22 percent of black phase 1 households with a person over the age of 50 are re-
interviewed in the second phase).  Both coefficients have t-statistics that are less than 1.  This 
finding that sample selection is not associated with pension eligibility is consistent with the 
results in the text: the reductions in child labor are in the hours of work and not in participation 
rates. 
This study focuses on children ages 10-17 in households with a black head. All of these 
children were born before the end of apartheid.  Hence, their parents are unlikely to have 
anticipated pension income at the time of conception.  Table A1 presents summary statistics for 
households with black household heads in the full SAYP sample and for the various restricted   34
samples that are used in this study.  All descriptive statistics in table A1, including the phase 2 
sample, are weighted to be nationally representative. 
Households in the Phase 1 and Phase 2 samples look similar.  This reflects the fact that 
three-fourths of the phase 1 sample (column 1) is eligible for phase 2.  Hence, the phase 2 sample 
in column 2 is a random sample of most of the households in column 1. 
Table A1 also illustrates that there is ample scope for the direct, within household sharing 
of income between the elderly and younger generations.  Households with a pensioner and a 
working child 10-17 (column 5) have on average 1.9 children between the ages of 10 and 17.  In 
the full, phase 1 sample (column 1), 26 percent of black households with children 10-17 also 
have a resident, pension eligible person and 26 percent report receiving pension income.  Thus a 
substantial portion of households with children are directly affected by the OAP. 
Four interesting characteristics about pension income, relevant to this study, are in table 
A1.  First, 79 percent of households with a pension eligible person report receiving pension 
income.  Pension take-up appears to not be universal (Case and Deaton 1998 find this as well), 
but a large portion of the eligible population receives it.  Second, there is some leakage in the 
pension program (this is known to occur) or measurement error in reported ages.  13 percent of 
households without a person that is pension eligible report receiving pension income.
  In column 
2, 7 percent of households without a person age 50 to 75 report pension incomes, but these 
households can include pension eligible persons above the age of 75.  Third, the average number 
of pensioners per household is 1.2.  Thus, some households may receive pension income from 
multiple individuals.  Fourth, co-residency of children with pension eligible women is more 
common than is co-residency of children with pension eligible men.  However, the difference in 
co-residency rates is approximately the same as the presence of pension eligible men and women 
in the general population (author's calculation from the full SAYP sample). 
  The raw data are also consistent with an increase in household income associated with the 
pension.  In columns 4 and 5 of table A1, the sample is restricted to households with a person 
between the age of 50 and 75.  When the household elder is pension eligible, the probability that 
the household reports receiving pension income increases by 600 percent. Moreover, in this same 
sub-sample, the probability that a household reports an income above the pension amount of 520 
Rands per month rises by 12 percentage points if at least one of the persons above 50 is pension 
eligible (t-statistic 8.167).  Hence, there is evidence within the SAYP that pension eligibility is 
associated with increased income. 
Appendix 2: Household Composition, Child Labor, and the Old Age Pension (OAP) 
A2.0 Overview 
  Pension income may induce children or other household members to move.  This 
observation has two possible implications for this study.  First, part of the mechanism through 
which pension income affects child labor is via changes in household composition.  This relates 
to the question of whether the observed effects are direct or indirect effects of liquidity 
constraints on child labor.  Second, if household composition shifts systematically with pension 
eligibility, the age of oldest male and female polynomial cannot fully capture all of the 
differences between child labor in pension eligible and ineligible households in the absence of 
pension income.  Thus, it is impossible to construct the counterfactual of what child labor would 
look like in the absence of pension income in pension eligible households.   35
  The data permit four ways to assess the importance of shifts in household composition in 
this paper's findings.  First, is there any evidence of changes in household composition with 
pension eligibility?  Edmonds and others (2003) look in the South African census and find 
relatively small changes in household composition.  Based on their findings, it is unlikely that 
household composition shifts can generate all of the results in the text, but this appendix 
considers evidence of movements in household composition in the SAYP.  Second, the SAYP 
collects migration information on children.  Restricting the sample to children who have not 
moved recently only addresses one type of change in household composition with pension 
income, but this is the only movement information in the dataset.  Third, after partialing out all 
of the differences in child labor association with household composition, is there any evidence of 
a link between child labor and pension eligibility.   This approach limits the variation with which 
to identify pension income effects on child labor if there is any association between pension 
income and household composition.  Fourth, is there any observed pension effect after 
controlling for household composition rather than redefining the dependent variable as 
household composition adjusted child labor.  This has already been discussed in the text and is 
not further explored here.  None of these approaches suggest large changes in the basic findings 
of this paper. 
A2.1 Co-residency of pensioners with children 
  In phase 1 of the SAYP data, there are 4,372 households with a person between the age 
of 50 and 75.  For these households, the number of children who appear in the household 
(children age 10 to 17) is regressed against pension eligibility with and without controlling for 
the age of oldest man and woman.  These results are in appendix table A2.  Without controlling 
for general age trends, there is a positive association between a single pension eligible female or 
a single pension eligible male and the residency of children although the coefficient on male 
pension eligibility is not statistically significant.  The magnitude of the association between 
single male pension eligibility and number of children increases upon controlling for general age 
trends, but the data do not reject the hypothesis that there is no association between pension 
eligibility and the number of co-resident children.  In the phase 2 sample used throughout the 
paper, there is no statistically significant evidence of any association between pension eligibility 
and the co-residency of children.  Moreover, the estimated magnitudes of the association 
between children and pension eligibility are very close to zero.  This difference between phase 1 
and phase 2 findings may be attributable to the sample selection issues discussed in the previous 
appendix. 
A2.2 Child migration and pension eligibility  
  While the data used in most of the paper do not suggest substantive increases in the 
presence of children around the elderly with the pension program, there could be important 
marginal changes that provide much of the variation used in earlier sections.  The only 
information in the SAYP about changes in household composition comes from asking children 
10-17 if they have moved in the last two years.  Appendix table A3 replicates most of the key 
regressions of the paper, restricting the sample to children who have not moved (this obviously 
does not control for movement by other household members).  Only 162 children between 10 
and 17 that co-reside with a person above the age of 50 have moved in the last two years.  This 
group does not appear to be particularly important in the previous sections' findings, because all 
of the results in the sample restricted to children that do not move are well within standard 
confidence intervals of the full sample results.   36
A2.3 Controlling for household composition effects 
  Another approach to the household composition problem is to first control for all of the 
variation in child labor associated with variation in household composition and then to relate the 
remaining variation in child labor to pension eligibility.  This can be accomplished in two steps.  
First, regress labor supply of child i in household j on various measures of household 
composition: 
(3)  01 1 ij j i ij HG P u α αα =+ + +  
where G is a vector of counts of the number of co-resident persons in ages 0-5, 6-9, 10-13, 14-
17, 18-22, 22-49, 50-75, and 76 plus in child i's household j and P is a vector of indicators for the 
presence of child i's mother, father, grandmother, grandfather, and both grandparents and 
parents.  Second, regress the residuals from (3) on the pension indicators and age of oldest man 
and woman series as in (1): 
(4)  ( ) 01 2 3 *, ij i i i i i i ij u PEF PEM PEF PEM AOM AOF β ββ β π ε =+ + + + + . 
The advantage of this approach is that it conditions out all of the differences in child labor 
associated with the household's population.  It comes with three costs.  First, this 
decomposability property is only a property of OLS, so the schooling results need to be re-
estimated with linear probability models.  Second, to the extent that there is any variation in 
household composition associated with pension income, the household composition controls 
capture these pension effects, limiting the variation available to identify pension effects in (5).  
Third, the dependent variable in these regressions is different from the regressions in the text.  
Hence, the comparability of this exercise to the results above is questionable. 
  The results from this exercise are in appendix table A4.  For each pension indicator 
(male, female, pem*pef), the percentage change in the regression coefficient is reported after 
controlling for household composition differences.  The estimates of  i β  (i=1,2,3) in the basic 
model (1) are treated as baselines for the purpose of calculating percentage changes.  The p-value 
for the null hypothesis that there is no change in  i β  between models (1) and (5) is also reported.  
Finally, the p-value for the null hypothesis that  i β is zero in (5) is reported. 
  A few results stand out in appendix table A4.  First, the data never reject the hypothesis 
that there is no change in estimates of  i β  between models (1) and (5).  Thus, as in the previous 
appendix tables, there is no statistically significant evidence of biased inference from household 
composition shifts.  Second, after conditioning out household composition variation, the 
hypothesis that the effects of pensions for women or for having both women and men are 
actually zero cannot be rejected.  However, the key effects for men persist even after partialing 
out household composition.  There are statistically significant declines in total hours worked that 
appear to primarily be in hours in market work.  Moreover, there is a statistically significant 
increase in schooling for children between the ages of 10 and 17.  In missing school for work, 
there are large changes in estimates of the effects of pension eligibility, but these coefficients are 
highly variable to begin with, so it is not clear how to interpret these changes.  Overall, the data 
do not reveal any evidence to suggest that shifts in household composition drive the results in the 
text. 
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Manuscript. Table 1: Means of Child (Ages 10 - 17) Characteristics
Full Sample









Sample Size 6,482 3,503 1,456 1,296
Population 5,327,912 2,593,989 1,217,059 1,300,116
Age 13.441 13.458 13.408 13.426
Sex 0.521 0.525 0.508 0.523
Residency Attributes
Father Co-Resident 0.347 0.412 0.419 0.183
Mother Co-Resident 0.628 0.775 0.632 0.382
Grandfather Co-Resident 0.099 0.006 0.106 0.249
Grandmother Co-Resident 0.289 0.018 0.278 0.780
Child has not moved in last 2 years 0.943 0.931 0.943 0.962
Hours in Child Labor in last 7 days
Total Hours 15.586 14.856 17.074 15.790
Household Economic Activities 7.023 6.890 7.386 7.030
Market Economic Activities 8.563 7.965 9.689 8.760
Schooling in last 12 months
Currently Attend School 0.961 0.960 0.957 0.961
Miss School for Work 0.022 0.023 0.021 0.017
 All data are from the phase 2 of the Survey of the Activities of Young People, 1999.
Other than sample size, each cell contains the mean weighted to be representative of the South African population.
Primary school completion is only for children ages 13 and older
Having problems with cost of school and missing school for work is conditional on being currently in schoolTable 2A: Child Labor and Pension Eligibility
Dependent Variable: Total Hours Economically Active
123456
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Tobit
Pension Eligible Female (PEF) -2.241 (1.837) -2.191 (1.848) -1.656 (1.769) -1.975 (1.737) -1.784 (1.713) -1.916 (1.242)
Pension Eligible Male (PEM) -5.724 (2.080) ** -5.844 (2.050) ** -5.873 (2.156) ** -5.961 (2.078) ** -7.195 (2.257) ** -6.016 (1.837) **
PEF * PEM 3.021 (2.965) 3.109 (2.979) 3.510 (2.839) 3.593 (2.720) 3.948 (2.813) 3.662 (2.372)
Female 0.592 (0.686) 0.759 (0.678) 0.897 (0.682) 0.923 (0.678) 1.062 (0.634) *
Series in Age of Oldest Man and 
Age of Oldest Woman yes yes yes yes yes yes
Polynomial in Child Age no yes yes yes yes yes
Province and Urban Fixed  no no yes yes yes yes
Housing  Controls no no no yes yes no
Household Composition  no no no no yes no
Adj R2 0.019 0.030 0.099 0.122 0.154 0.013
N 2752 2752 2752 2752 2752 2752
* significant at 10%.  ** Significant at 5%.  Standard errors  (in parenthesis) corrected for clustering at the psu level and arbitrary heteroskedasticity.  
 All data are from the phase 2 of the Survey of the Activities of Young People, 1999.
All regressions also include a constant. 
Series expansion is a third order series expansion in the age of the oldest male, the age of the oldest female, and all of their interactions.  
The polynomial in child age is a third order polynomial.
Urban fixed effects include formal urban, informal urban, and commercial farms (other rural) is the omitted group
Columns 1-5 are OLS.  Column 6 is a tobit. R2 in column 6 is a pseudo-R2.
Housing controls include indicators for the following: the dwelling is a house, hut, flat, or shack (other omitted) ; the dwellling has 1 room or 2 to 4 rooms (5 or more rooms 
omitted); the dwelling has electricity; the household cooks with wood; the household cooks with parafin; the household heats with wood; the household heats with parafin; the 
household gets water from a within dwelling tap; the household gets water from an on-site tap; the household gets water from a public tap; and the household cultivates land.
Household composition controls are a vector of dummies for the presence of a mother, a father, a grandparent, grandparents and parents, the number of household members 0-5, 
6-9, 10-13, 14-17, 18-22, 22-49, 50-75, and 76 plus.Table 2B: Child Labor and Pension Eligibility with Artificial Treatment Variables
Dependent Variable: Total Hours Economically Active
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Pension Eligible Female (PEF) -1.745 (1.865) -1.382 (1.890)
Pension Eligible Male (PEM) -6.298 (2.405) ** -7.014 (2.469) **
PEF * PEM 3.033 (2.989) 4.363 (3.113)
Woman Age 55 or greater (WA5) -0.484 (1.772) -0.119 (1.876) -0.765 (1.850)
Man Age 60 or greater (MA6) -0.024 (2.082) 1.239 (2.280) 1.370 (2.303)
WA5*MA6 2.195 (2.511) 1.805 (2.625) 1.292 (2.636)
Woman Age 65 or greater (WA6) -0.547 (2.451) 2.247 (2.472)
Man Age 70 or greater (MA7) -2.621 (1.728) -2.089 (1.725)
WA6*MA7 -4.431 (3.580) -6.092 (3.717)
Woman Age 65 or greater (WA6) -2.344 (1.863)
Man Age 60 or greater (MA6) 0.987 (1.669)
WA6*MA6 -3.112 (2.970)
Female 0.766 (0.688) 0.854 (0.678) 0.835 (0.677) 0.799 (0.682) 0.914 (0.682)
Series in Age of Oldest Man and 
Age of Oldest Woman yes yes yes yes yes
Polynomial in Child Age yes yes yes yes yes
Province and Urban Fixed  yes yes yes yes yes
Adj R2 0.095 0.098 0.098 0.100 0.103
N 2752 2752 2752 2752 2752
* significant at 10%.  ** Significant at 5%.  Standard errors (in parenthesis) corrected for clustering at the psu level and arbitrary heteroskedasticity.  
All regressions also include a constant. 
Series expansion is a third order series expansion in the age of the oldest male, the age of the oldest female, and all of their interactions.  
The polynomial in child age is a third order polynomial.
All Columns are OLS.  All data are from the phase 2 of the Survey of the Activities of Young People, 1999.Table 3: Pension Eligibility and School Attendence
Probit Results, Marginal Effects Reported
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Pension Eligible Female 0.003 (0.011) -0.024 (0.043) 0.059 (0.040) *
Pension Eligible Male 0.043 (0.009) ** -0.066 (0.065) -0.037 (0.017) *
PEF * PEM -0.159 (0.122) ** 0.026 (0.111) -0.026 (0.023)
Female -0.001 (0.005) -0.018 (0.017) 0.013 (0.012)
Series in Age of Oldest Man 
and Age of Oldest Woman yes yes yes
Polynomial in Child Age yes yes yes
Province and Urban Fixed 
Effects yes yes yes
Adj R2 0.193 0.038 0.106
N 2748 2571 768
* significant at 10%.  ** Significant at 5%.  Reported coefficients are for a change in the indicted variable from 0 
Standard errors (parenthesis) corrected for clustering at the psu level and arbitrary heteroskedasticity.  
 All data are from the phase 2 of the Survey of the Activities of Young People, 1999.
All regressions also include a constant. 
The polynomial in child age is a third order polynomial.
The dataset is missing schooling information for 4 children.
Columns 2 and 3 are limited to children that attend school.  
Series expansion is a third order series expansion in the age of the oldest male, the age of the oldest female, and 




w/ Cost of 
Schooling
Miss School for 
WorkTable 4: Child Labor and Pension Eligibility
Dependent Variable: Total Hours in Market and Household Economic Activities
Household Economic Activities Market Economic Activities
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit
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Pension Eligible Female 0.287 (0.794) 0.173 (0.586) -1.944 (1.346) -3.167 (1.272) **
Pension Eligible Male -1.188 (0.833) -1.193 (0.864) -4.686 (1.739) ** -6.146 (1.905) **
PEF * PEM 0.710 (1.244) 0.695 (1.118) 2.800 (2.086) 3.506 (2.470)
Female 1.425 (0.273) ** 1.841 (0.299) ** -0.665 (0.541) -0.693 (0.652)
Series in Age of Oldest Man 
and Age of Oldest Woman yes yes yes yes
Polynomial in Child Age yes yes yes yes
Province and Urban Fixed 
Effects yes yes yes yes
Adj R2 0.068 0.012 0.114 0.031
N 2752 2752 2752 2752
* significant at 10%.  ** Significant at 5%.  
 All data are from the phase 2 of the Survey of the Activities of Young People, 1999.
Standard errors (parenthesis) corrected for clustering at the psu level and arbitrary heteroskedasticity.  
All regressions also include a constant. 
Series expansion is a third order series expansion in the age of the oldest male, the age of the oldest female, and all of their interactions.  
The polynomial in child age is a third order polynomial.
Columns 1 and 3 are OLS.  Columns 2 and 4 are tobits: a pseudo-R2 is reported.Table 5: Elder Education, Pension Eligibility, Child Labor, and School Attendence
OLS OLS OLS Probit
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Pension Eligible Female -0.555 (2.138) 0.295 (1.105) -1.311 (1.534) 0.002 (0.014)
*Education of Elder Female 0.068 (0.236) 0.081 (0.155) 0.012 (0.149) 0.003 (0.002)
Pension Eligible Male -8.084 (2.288) ** -1.890 (0.958) ** -5.986 (1.737) ** 0.037 (0.010)
*Education of Elder Male 0.635 (0.347) * 0.104 (0.160) 0.521 (0.235) ** 0.002 (0.004)
PEF * PEM 4.961 (3.102) 1.385 (1.379) 3.947 (2.309) * -0.046 (0.061)
*Education of Elder Female 0.188 (0.525) 0.049 (0.226) 0.110 (0.372) 0.000 (0.003)
*Education of Elder Male -0.593 (0.608) -0.152 (0.241) -0.431 (0.413) -0.006 (0.005)
Education of Elder Female -0.180 (0.113) -0.102 (0.058) * -0.071 (0.082) 0.002 (0.001)
Education of Elder Male -0.094 (0.162) 0.048 (0.074) -0.142 (0.118) 0.001 (0.001)
Female 1.128 (0.678) * 1.542 (0.274) ** -0.490 (0.535) -0.001 (0.006)
yes yes yes yes
yes yes yes yes
yes yes yes yes
Adj R2 0.103 0.075 0.120 0.188
N 2606 2606 2606 2606
* significant at 10%.  ** Significant at 5%.  Reported coefficients are for a change in the indicted variable from 0 to 1.
 All data are from the phase 2 of the Survey of the Activities of Young People, 1999.
Standard errors corrected for clustering at the psu level and arbitrary heteroskedasticity.  
All regressions also include a constant. 
Series expansion is a third order series expansion in the age of the oldest male, the age of the oldest female, and all of their interactions.  
The polynomial in child age is a third order polynomial.
Marginal effects reported for probits.
Series in Age of Oldest Man 
and Age of Oldest Woman
Polynomial in Child Age











ActivitiesAppendix Table A1: Means of Household Characteristics for black headed households with children 10-
Sample Phase 1









12 3 4 5
Sample Size 10,480 3,685 2,208 785 692
Population 3,743,031 1,250,500 712,507 271,742 266,251
Urban 0.462 0.488 0.532 0.462 0.398
Household Size 6.016 5.982 5.322 6.473 7.245
Number of Children 0-17 3.110 3.101 2.942 3.125 3.502
Number of Children 10-17 1.760 1.784 1.715 1.847 1.905
Number of Persons 50 or greater 0.647 0.614 0.062 1.211 1.483
Number of Pension Eligible Individuals 0.319 0.293 0.062 1.209
Qualify for Phase 2 0.740
Age of Oldest Female 46.308 45.628 37.412 48.675 64.508
Age of Oldest Male 34.324 34.096 28.526 40.312 42.656
Pension Eligible Female in the 
Household 0.230 0.209 0.045 0.863
Pension Eligible Male in the Household 0.079 0.077 0.017 0.314
Both Pension Eligible Female and Male 
in the Household 0.045 0.040 0.005 0.177
Household Recieves Pension Income 0.257 0.237 0.069 0.132 0.793
Dwelling is a House 0.555 0.546 0.546 0.533 0.560
Dwelling is a Hut 0.237 0.215 0.177 0.250 0.280
Dwelling is a Shack 0.145 0.171 0.200 0.150 0.118
Dwelling is  a Flat 0.020 0.026 0.035 0.023 0.005
One Room Dwelling 0.061 0.071 0.090 0.055 0.036
Two - Four Room Dwelling 0.564 0.564 0.597 0.534 0.504
Dwelling has electricity 0.626 0.633 0.659 0.601 0.594
Cook with Fire 0.327 0.310 0.258 0.344 0.416
Cook with Parafin 0.206 0.225 0.230 0.223 0.216
Heat with Fire 0.355 0.341 0.292 0.378 0.437
Heat with Parafin 0.171 0.195 0.197 0.195 0.189
Water in house 0.252 0.248 0.262 0.255 0.205
Water on Site 0.253 0.263 0.277 0.236 0.253
Uses Public Water Tap 0.227 0.240 0.236 0.255 0.235
Cultivate Land 0.364 0.362 0.318 0.382 0.461
Other than sample size, each cell contains the mean of the indicated variable weighted to be representative of the South African 
population.
Phase 2
Column 4 contains 115 households that do not have anyone between 50 and 75, but do have a person above the age of 75
Households with 
person 50 to 75Appendix Table A2: Pension Eligibility and the Co-habitation of Children and Elderly
Dependent Variable: Number of co-resident children between 10 and 17
Household level regressions - conditional on having an elder, age 50 to 75
Full Sample Phase 2 Sample
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Pension Eligible Female 0.066 (0.037) * 0.013 (0.064) 0.020 (0.063) 0.000 (0.114)
Pension Eligible Male 0.073 (0.062) 0.093 (0.095) -0.002 (0.102) -0.005 (0.140)
PEF * PEM -0.083 (0.090) -0.106 (0.123) 0.038 (0.145) -0.040 (0.200)
Constant 1.782 (0.024) ** 1.321 (1.061) 1.852 (0.038) ** 0.809 (2.075)
Series in Age of Oldest Man 
and Age of Oldest Woman no yes no yes
Adj R2 0.001 0.014 0.000 0.018
N 4372 4372 1478 1478
* significant at 10%.  ** Significant at 5%.  Reported coefficients are for a change in the indicted variable from 0 to 1.
All data in columns 1 & 2 are from the phase 1 of the Survey of the Activities of Young People, 1999. Columns 3 & 4 are from phase 2.
Standard errors (parenthesis) corrected for clustering at the psu level and arbitrary heteroskedasticity.  
Series expansion is a third order series expansion in the age of the oldest male, the age of the oldest female, and all of their interactions.  
All regressions also include a constantAppendix Table A3: Pension Eligibility, Child Labor, and School Attendence for Stationary Children
Regressions limited to children that have not moved within the last two years
OLS OLS OLS Probit
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Pension Eligible Female -2.031 (1.799) -0.061 (0.821) -1.970 (1.357) -0.001 (0.012)
Pension Eligible Male -4.741 (2.041) ** -1.347 (0.889) -3.393 (1.530) ** 0.036 (0.009) **
PEF * PEM 3.785 (2.850) 0.864 (1.270) 2.921 (2.069) -0.057 (0.061)
Female 0.714 (0.700) 1.425 (0.273) ** -0.710 (0.562) 0.001 (0.006)
Series in Age of Oldest Man 
and Age of Oldest Woman yes yes yes yes
Polynomial in Child Age yes yes yes yes
Province and Urban Fixed 
Effects yes yes yes yes
Adj R2 0.102 0.072 0.112 0.191
N 2590 2590 2590 2589
* significant at 10%.  ** Significant at 5%.  Reported coefficients are for a change in the indicted variable from 0 to 1.
 All data are from the phase 2 of the Survey of the Activities of Young People, 1999.
Standard errors corrected for clustering at the psu level and arbitrary heteroskedasticity.  
All regressions also include a constant. 
Series expansion is a third order series expansion in the age of the oldest male, the age of the oldest female, and all of their interactions.  
The polynomial in child age is a third order polynomial.











ActivitiesAppendix Table A4: Household Composition Controls and the Efficiency of Child Labor













 Pension Eligible Female
% ∆ in β -0.519 0.958 -0.301 -0.705
P-Value for H0:  ∆ = 0 0.606 0.717 0.645 0.749
P-Value for H0: β2 = 0 0.633 0.459 0.286 0.893
Pension Eligible Male
% ∆ in β -0.062 -0.049 -0.065 -0.209
P-Value for H0:  ∆ = 0 0.869 0.944 0.865 0.429
P-Value for H0: β2 = 0 0.012 0.174 0.015 0.003
PEF * PEM
% ∆ in β 0.032 -0.015 0.044 -0.322
P-Value for H0:  ∆ = 0 0.968 0.993 0.953 0.662
P-Value for H0: β2 = 0 0.198 0.563 0.161 0.357
First stage regressions follow the specification used throughout tables 4-7.
 All data are from the phase 2 of the Survey of the Activities of Young People, 1999.
Household composition controls are a vector of dummies for the presence of a mother, a father, a grandparent, grandparents 
and parents, the number of household members 0-5, 6-9, 10-13, 14-17, 18-22, 22-49, 50-75, and 76 plus.
The second stage regressions are in two steps.  First, the indicated dependent variable is regressed on household composition 
controls.  The residuals from this first step are then regressed on the regression specificication used in the first stage.
The row "% ∆ in β" contains the percentage change in the indicated regression coefficient in the second step of the second 
stage, treating the first stage regression as the baseline.
The row "P-Value for H0:  ∆ = 0" contains the P-Value for the null hypothesis that that the change in regression coefficients 
between the first and second stage is zero.
The row " P-Value for H0: β2 = 0" contains the P-Value for the null hypothesis that that the coefficient on the indicated 
coefficient in the second step of the second stage is zero.